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FOREWORD 
Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye* 
It is with pleasure that I contribute this foreword to the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review symposium on the California Supreme 
Court. I am thankful that the editors of this volume have chosen this 
theme, and I welcome the interest they and the symposium 
contributors have in our jurisprudence. I will use this opportunity to 
offer a few comments relevant to the six cases discussed in this 
symposium, and to our work at the court generally. 
These six cases all were decided by the court between August 
2017 and June 2019. For most of that span, there was an empty seat at 
the court due to the retirement of Justice Kathryn Werdegar. Briggs v. 
Brown1 was among the last cases to have benefitted from Justice 
Werdegar’s involvement. Justices from the Courts of Appeal sat with 
us as justices pro tempore as we awaited a new colleague. Because 
each pro tempore appointment involves only a single case, more than 
half of the justices sitting on the Courts of Appeal joined us at least 
once during this time frame. Within this cohort, Justice Dennis Perluss 
of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, participated in 
People v. Buza,2 the subject of one contribution to this symposium; 
and Justice Jonathan Renner of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, joined the court as we considered and decided In re I.C.3 
Justices pro tempore bring fresh perspectives to matters before 
the court, and I am extremely grateful for their service. Yet my 
colleagues and I also welcomed the appointment and subsequent 
confirmation of Joshua Groban as our newest associate justice, joining 
the court in January 2019. Justice Groban participated in the other 
 
 * Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. 
 1. 3 Cal.5th 808 (2017). 
 2. 4 Cal.5th 658 (2018). 
 3. 4 Cal.5th 869 (2018). 
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three matters discussed in this symposium: Southern California Gas 
Leak Cases,4 People v. Valenzuela,5 and In re Cook.6 
Of the six cases comprising this symposium, all but two produced 
a dissenting (or concurring and dissenting) opinion or opinions. This 
small sample is somewhat misleading, however. Much more often 
than not, our decisions are unanimous. With the diversity of 
backgrounds and viewpoints on the court, our frequent unanimity 
might come as a surprise to some observers. A simplistic view would 
regard such consensus as unlikely given that three of us were 
appointed by Republican governors, and four by a Democratic 
successor. But neither principles of law nor jurisprudential 
philosophies necessarily cleave along such lines. 
A more interesting, and potentially productive, inquiry would 
consider why the court so often reaches a consensus. There are many 
possible explanations. The one I would like to develop here concerns 
our comprehensive deliberative process. Each decision by our court 
emerges from several conversations among the justices at different 
stages of a case’s progression. These conversations are nothing out of 
the ordinary—in fact, they are essential—at an institution such as ours. 
But especially in light of the current state of public discourse, our 
procedures may deserve a closer look insofar as they demonstrate how 
people holding diverse views can work through difficult issues in a 
manner that is both civil and thorough. 
The first of these conversations occurs at our petition 
conferences. My colleagues and I meet approximately forty times each 
year to discuss recently filed petitions for review and writ petitions, 
several thousand of which are received by the court annually. Most of 
these petitions are denied; only about 1 percent proceed to briefing, 
argument, and a decision by this court. Our collective consideration of 
these petitions provides an initial opportunity for each of us to size up 
a case and assess how our colleagues perceive the matter. These 
conferences also can result in the restatement of the issues presented 
in a petition, which we sometimes order to better focus the parties’ 
future efforts as well our own. These adjustments help ensure that our 
subsequent conversations are more productively trained on the 
specific issues that require our collective attention. 
 
 4. 7 Cal.5th 391 (2019). 
 5. 7 Cal.5th 415 (2019). 
 6. 7 Cal.5th 439 (2019). 
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Once review has been granted, I assign each case to a justice for 
the preparation of a memorandum, known as a calendar memorandum, 
that is effectively a first draft of an opinion for the court. The 
subsequent circulation of a calendar memorandum to other chambers 
initiates another dialogue regarding a case. Upon consideration of a 
calendar memorandum, each other justice composes and distributes 
within the court a written response, which in turn commonly leads to 
both formal and informal replies. Typically, a case will be set for oral 
argument only when this exchange of ideas has resulted in a majority 
of justices coalescing around a tentative analysis and holding. This 
process may seem cumbersome, but our collective investment of 
substantial effort prior to oral argument serves several useful purposes. 
Among them, our procedures are conducive to conversations aimed at 
identifying ways to resolve a case that all members of the court regard 
as appropriate and just, which can be different from the approach 
initially proposed by the calendar memorandum. 
Oral argument then provides an opportunity for the justices to 
engage with counsel regarding ideas that may have originated in the 
parties’ briefs, but were substantially developed (or called into 
question) through the court’s deliberations. Afterward, beginning with 
another conference that immediately follows a slate of arguments, my 
colleagues and I continue our own conversations. This post-argument 
dialogue extends through the internal circulation and possible revision 
of a written opinion for the court, and ceases only with its filing. 
At this final phase of the process, what differences remain among 
the justices regarding how a case should be resolved are usually ironed 
out through collaboration and compromise. Sometimes, however, 
these disagreements prove intractable and lead to concurring or 
dissenting opinions. The existence of these minority opinions goes to 
show that even extended and respectful discourse will not always yield 
a consensus. But no one should expect an invariably unanimous court. 
Ultimately, my fellow justices and I understand that our 
opinions—be they majority, concurring, or dissenting—represent our 
institution’s contribution to a more extensive set of conversations 
regarding the law, in which our court is but one of several participants. 
Some of these conversations are with our fellow judges, in this state 
and elsewhere, as well with past and future members of our own court. 
And like other courts, we also participate in an ongoing dialogue with 
the legislative and executive branches of government as we review 
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their work. Somewhat more distinctively, as illustrated by cases such 
as Briggs, Buza, and Valenzuela, California courts engage in similar 
conversations with the electorate when voters exercise the power of 
initiative.7 
I recognize that it is hardly novel to describe a court’s work as 
conversational in nature. But constructive conversations within and 
among the courts and those who make the law in general are essential 
and cannot be taken for granted. To the extent that this symposium 
provides additional perspectives regarding the decisions of the 
California Supreme Court and thereby promotes an enhanced 
understanding of its efforts, it contributes toward such conversations, 
and toward the growth of the law. 
 
 7. Cal. Const., art. II, section 8. 
